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ISSUES RAISED IN VIEW OF THE STATE'S REPONSE 
I. Whether the state may with impunity come to hearings unprepared and be granted 
a continuance. 
II. Whether the poor must tell the state all the facts that may suppmi a defense in 
order to receive any assistance. 
III. Whether the state need only promulgate rules with the force and effect of law 
when authorized by the legislature, and may do so as it pleases in all other 
instances. 




The state argues in its response that the issue of whether to continue a hearing where one 
party arrives unprepared despite having two months to subpoena their witness is a discretionary 
call for the comt. The state argues that it need not show that its neglect is excusable. Rather, all 
that matters is speedy trial rights and the interests of the state. The state's argument is far afield 
from anything resembling fundamental fairness, and seems to insist on the principles of noblesse 
oblige. 
A. Time 
The state contends that pretrial motions are controlled by law, but then cites to I.C.R. 12. 
Apparently, the state is unaware that court rules are not laws. State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 
541 (1985). The defendant was arguing about the time for a hearing, the state dwells upon the 
rules for filing. The state then insists that I.C.R. 45(b) only applies to filing and service of 
documents, but provides no authority for this assertion. 
If the state is right, there are no rules in a criminal case determining the timing for 
hearings and when they may be continued. Considering that the Idaho Supreme Court held in 
State v. Ruiz, 106 Idaho 336, 337 (1984), that the Idaho Criminal Rules must be construed in 
accordance with I.C.R. 2(a), that asse1tion seems unlikely. The title of I.C.R. 45 is "Time." Not, 
"Time Requirements for the Service and Filing of Documents," but "Time." There is little case 
law on precisely what rules govern the interpretation of rules, but in State v. Stradley, 127 Idaho 
203 (1995), the Idaho Supreme Court declined to interpret a rule so as to render it meaningless. 
In this case, the word "act" is defined as essentially anything except the filing of a notice of 
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appeal. The state dismisses this by claiming that this Court should read the word "act" in I.C.R. 
45(b) in conjunction with (a) which refers to the filing and service of documents, (c) which sets a 
limit on the minimum time after the filing of a motion and affidavit before a hearing can be set 
and (d) which refers to responses by mail. Unsurprisingly, the state ignores the fact that (c) deals 
directly with the time for hearings. Nor does I.C.R. 45 at any point use the word "act" in 
association with the filing and service of documents, nor does it state "an act under this rule" or 
anything else that resembles an indication that the rule was meant to be so limited. Rather, I.C.R. 
45(b )(2) specifically refers to "[ e ]nlarging the time upon motion made after the expiration of the 
specified period and permit the act to be done if the failure to act was the result of excusable 
neglect.." 
The state's reading of I.C.R. 45(b) would be: 
(b) Enlargement. When [the filing and service of documents], other than the 
filing of a notice of appeal, is required or allowed to be done at or within a 
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion: 
(1) With or without motion or notice, order the period enlarged if request therefor 
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by 
a previous order, 
(2) Enlarge the time upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period 
and permit [the filing and service of documents] to be done if the failure to [file or 
serve the documents] was the result of excusable neglect, or, 
(3) Enlarge the time upon stipulation of the parties; but the court may not extend 
the time for taking any action under Rules 29, 34 and 35, or for the perfecting of 
an appeal, except to the extent and under the condition stated therein. 
Presumably, the rules committee knows how to promulgate the rule so that it would mean what 
the rules committee intended. It is unlikely that the committee created a rule called "Time," and 
set down a rule for enlarging the time period required before "acts," followed by a rule that 
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requires a certain amount of time before a hearing can be set, but only intended the rule as to 
enlargement of time periods for the "filing and service of documents," a phrase it seemed 
perfectly capable of using just a subsection before. 
Even under the state's understanding of I.C.R. 45(b), the state fails to explain how there 
was "good cause" for a continuance. The state came to a hearing unprepared. Its witness was 
not secured. It gave a lame excuse that there was a "childcare" issue. Had the defense done as 
much for his client, a warrant would have been issued. The period to be requesting more time for 
good cause had ended. Time was up. The state's contention, that it needs not show that its 
neglect was excusable, is inexcusable. It is a direct violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct. See l.R.P.C. 1.3, 3.2, 3.4. This Court should firmly set itself against any such 
interpretation. 
B. Discretion 
"When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a 
multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived 
the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) 
whether the comi reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Associates Northwest. Inc. v. 
Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605 (Ct.App.1987). The state insists that there are no boundaries, save the 
interest of the state and speedy trial rights, evidently forgetting its own citation to State v. Miller, 
133 Idaho 457,458 (1999), which inquires of the prejudice to the defendant apartfrom speedy 
trial. 
The defendant argues that this Court should see guidance in I.R.E. 804(a)(4) for when to 
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determine whether a nonappearance of a witness is "good cause' or "excusable neglect." The 
state would have this Court simply leave up the decision to the particular judge. In Kootenai 
County, that mindset already makes mischief, causing dismissals in some courtrooms while other 
judges who are more lax toward the state allow unprepared prosecutors and police or probation 
officers, who see subpoenas as simple requests, to continue unimpeded in their lack of respect for 
the judicial system. The defendant did not say that I.R.E. 804 applies here. But it is a place to 
start, if this system is going to remain reliable and fair. 
However, the Supreme Court also looked at availability within the context of a 
continuance in State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255 (2000). The Court found: 
We conclude that the magistrate erred by improperly denying Clark's motion to 
dismiss for violation of his speedy trial rights under LC. § 19-3501 (3). In this 
case, the magistrate granted a continuance beyond the statutory limit without a 
showing of good cause by the State. The State argues that the delay was 
attributable to witness unavailability, which it asserts is a valid reason 
justifying the continuance of the trial date. We disagree, not because 
unavailability cannot substantiate a finding of good cause, but because French 
does not qualify as an unavailable witness. 
The State equates French's unavailability with that of a "missing witness," which 
the Supreme Court in Barker identifies as a valid reason to justify an appropriate 
delay. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,531 (1972). But the record in this case 
indicates that French was neither "missing" in any sense of the word, nor was she 
actually "unavailable." There is an enormous difference between being 
inconvenienced and being unavailable. True unavailability suggests an unqualified 
inability to attend, while inconvenience merely implies that as in a case such as 
this, attendance at trial would be burdensome. Here, French could have attended 
the September 22 trial, and in fact was compelled to do so by the magistrate's 
previous order. The State, however, not wishing to have French travel from out of 
state only to face postponement of the trial, requested that Clark's trial either be 
given top priority on September 22 or moved to a date in which the trial would 
have first priority. But the desire to accommodate French's schedule cannot be 
said to comprise a reason that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the delay. The 
Court recognizes that French is both a witness and the victim in this case and is 
thus conscious of her right to attend the trial, as well as the importance of her 
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presence. See Idaho Const. art. I, § 22 (" 'Victims' Rights Amendment"). But 
French's right to be present at the proceeding should not overshadow Clark's right 
to a speedy trial, which is a fundamental right protected by the United States and 
Idaho Constitutions and by I.C. § 19-3501. See Klopfer v. State of North Carolina, 
386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967); State v. Lindsay, 96 Idaho 474, 
475,531 P.2d 236,237 (1975). Accordingly, we conclude that Clark's right to a 
speedy trial under I. C. § 19-3501 (3) has been abridged. The State has not shown 
any additional justification other than its wish to make concessions for French's 
schedule for its failure to prosecute Clark during the mandatory six-month period. 
[ emphasis added] 
Id. at 260-61. This case, just as in Clark, is about a prosecutor and a court unwilling to 
inconvenience an officer of the law. No subpoena was issued. No real explanation was offered. 
Children are brought to court by the clients of the Public Defender all the time due to childcare 
issues. When an office of the law chooses to ignore a hearing for such reasons, that cannot 
suddenly become "good cause." 
C. Prejudice 
The state argues: "Hayne's attempt to equate the interest of the state in presenting its case 
on the merits with a showing of unfair prejudice - when Haynes was not otherwise hampered in 
the preparation of her defense or deprived of her right to a speedy trial - finds no support in the 
law." Perhaps the state means the "criminal law." The law provides much support for 
dismissing for being unprepared, particularly where one is the prosecuting party: 
Everhart argues that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the case 
with prejudice, because the Respondents, as the nonmoving parties, did not 
demonstrate prejudice. However, prejudice is only one of the factors which a trial 
court must weigh when it considers whether to dismiss a case. The court must 
consider the length of delay due to the plaintiffs failure to prosecute or otherwise 
move the case; the justification for the delay, ifthere is indeed any justification; 
and the extent of the resulting prejudice to the defendant, if any. See Gerstner v. 
Washington Water Power Co., 122 Idaho 673, 677 (1992); Day v. CIBA Geigy 
Corp., 115Idaho 1015, 1018(1989). 
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The district court considered all three factors set forth in Gerstner and Day. As to 
the first factor, the length of delay, the next available trial date would have been 
six months after the one originally scheduled. Further, the case had been filed 
nearly two years before the scheduled trial date, and the accident giving rise to the 
lawsuit occurred nearly four years earlier. Second, the district court considered 
that the justification for the proposed delay was to allow Schlender to start over 
with the case and do trial preparation. Schlender was not simply requesting a few 
additional days or an additional week to familiarize himself with the case. In 
addition, the district court correctly ruled that the fact that Everhart had been 
representing herself pro se was not a reason to begin the case all over again. 
Third, the Respondents asserted several ways in which they would be prejudiced 
by the proposed delay, including having already subpoenaed witnesses. 
Some of the elements of prejudice deal with delay, which Everhart argues is not a 
sufficient reason under Idaho law to dismiss the case. That is not a correct 
statement of the law. The rule in Idaho is that" 'it is an abuse of discretion to use 
the power of dismissal to punish a period of delay which no longer exists if the 
defendant has not established prejudice resulting from the delay.' " Gerstner, 122 
Idaho at 677, 837 P.2d at 803 (quoting Day, 115 Idaho at I 018, 772 P.2d at 225) 
(emphasis in Day). The district comi did not abuse its discretion: it dismissed the 
case not to punish Everhart and Schlender for causing delay, but upon Schlender's 
unequivocal representation that they would not be prepared for trial and would not 
call witnesses. 
Everhart v. Washington County Road and Bridge Dept., 130 Idaho 273 ( 1997). Since a 
dismissal with prejudice was the only possible outcome due to the state's intransigence in this 
matter, Gerstner should apply. This is a case involving a state that has grown so comfortable 
with its favored position in the courtroom that it does not subpoena witnesses and offers lame 
one-sentence excuses for not being prepared at Motion to Suppress hearing it has known about 
for months. Meanwhile, defendants receive bench warrants for the same conduct. The situation 
is unacceptable. It is the state's position that has no basis in the law, so long as law comports 
with fundamental fairness and the dictates of Due Process. 
D. Mootness 
For the first time on appeal to this Court the state argues in a footnote that the issues here 
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are moot. "An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial controversy that is 
capable of being concluded" by judicial relief. Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 163, 177 
P.3d 372,377 (2008) (quotingAmeritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 
849, 851, 119 P.3d 624, 626 (2005)). This issue is not moot. The Magistrate erred in continuing 
a hearing that, but for error, would have concluded, due to the state's failures, in the dismissal of 
the defendant's charges with prejudice. This Court can provide that relief, and it should. 
II. 
The state argues on appeal that the Equal Protection Clause, the right to remain silent, and 
the right to counsel in criminal cases are essentially trivialities, that the accused when poor has 
no actual right to anything of these things, and must provide the state with his evidence and 
theories before he may have anything resembling a fair trial. 
The state argues that State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1998) already settled the law in Idaho. 
This would be quite amazing. Wood, after all, involved a claim for post-conviction relief. Id. at 
92. The Idaho Supreme Court was not reviewing the issue de nova, but rather it was reviewing 
the decision of defense counsel to apply in open court for relief. Id. at 99. It is rare that a post-
conviction case, which reviews settled law to see if error exists, itself answers a hitherto 
unanswered question. See State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176 (Ct.App.2011) (reviewing a prior 
analysis and ruling in a post-conviction case in an appellate case). Here, the state insists that the 
sentence "[t]here is no constitutional infirmity in this process," settled the constitutionality of 
requests for assistance in open court. Wholly taken out of context and forgetting the standard of 
review, that might be so. But even then, note that the sentence was only directed at the issue of 
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requiring a separate judge, not the requirement that the request be made ex parte. See id. at 99-
100. So even accepting the state's argument that this sentence was anything more than a 
comment on the state of constitutional law in 1998 reviewing a 1993 trial attorney's competence, 
the state's underlying argument, that the Magistrate did not err in granting an ex parte hearing, 
fails. 
The state goes on to argue that the defendant's reliance on various authorities from other 
jurisdictions are meaningless since they were all pre-Wood. The state argues Wood himself 
argued based on State v. Ballard, 333 N.C. 515, 428 S.E.2d 178 (1993), and thus, the defendant 
here cannot possibly overcome that ruling. Again, attention to detail is of assistance. The Idaho 
Supreme Court was not reviewing the constitutionality of the process provided. The Court was 
reviewing the state of the law at that time: The Supreme Comi in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 
(1985), had left the implementation of the right to assistance to states, and Idaho had passed LC. 
§ 19-852(a)(2). It concludes that section with: 
Whittier did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by making the requests 
for assistance in open court with notice to the prosecutor. 
This will be the first time an appellate court (aside from the District Court) determines 
this issue on direct appeal. This Court may now parse the cases in favor of finding that the 
Constitution and the Judicial Cannons require an ex parte and independent judge for requests for 
assistance. This Court may now review: Ex parte Moody, 684 So. 2d 114, 83 A.LR.5th 795 
(Ala. 1996); Corenevsky v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 307,204 Cal. Rptr. 165, 682 P.2d 360 
(1984); Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Barnett, 909 S.W.2d 
423 (Tenn. 1995); Bright v. State, 265 Ga. 265,455 S.E.2d 37 (1995); State v. Ballard, 333 N.C. 
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515, 428 S.E.2d 178 (1993); State v. Bates, 333 N .C. 523, 428 S.E.2d 693 (1993); People v. 
Loyer, 169 Mich. App. 105,425 N.W.2d 714 (1988), and determine if these authorities are 
persuasive. 
The state points this Court to Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739 (Ind. 2002); State v. FVhite, 
457 S.E.2d 841, 848 (N.C.1995); State v. Apelt, 861 P.2d 634,650 (Ariz. 1993); Ramdass v. 
Commonwealth, 437 S.E.2d 566,571 (Va. 1993), cert. granted andjudgment vacated on other 
grounds, 512 U.S. 1217 (1994); State v. Floody, 481 N.W.2d 242,256 (S.D. 1992); State v. 
Phipps, 418 S.E.2d 178, 188-91 (N.C. 1992). This Court should review and compare these 
cases, though the defense would warn the Court that the state's reliance on these cases is likely in 
error. Stevens involves post-conviction relief (note, however, that it was not, as in Wood, a 
review for ineffective assistance, but as to whether fundamental rights had been violated) and 
holds: 
While we recognize that strategic considerations will often lead defense counsel 
to prefer secrecy as to their funding requests, we find no automatic constitutional 
entitlement to such ex parte proceedings. A trial court may, however, upon a 
showing of good cause, permit an ex parte request for funds for assistance. The 
denial of such a request is reviewable for abuse of discretion. 
770 N.E.2d at 759. This was a shift aware from Indiana's previous stance, that ex parte requests 
for funds violated that state's rules of ethics. See id. at 758 citing Newhart v. State, 669 N.E.2d 
953 (Ind.1996). The state cites to two cases from North Carolina, White and Phipps. North 
Carolina, of course, decided Ballard, as well as Bates. North Carolina separates whether a 
request for funds must be ex parte depending on the expert requested. See White, 457 S.E.2d at 
849. In certain circumstances, the lower court has discretion, in others, it must be ex parte. This 
is a rather odd and unique system that does not seem particularly necessary. Still, these cases do 
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not support the state's position in this matter. 
The state provides the essential reasoning of the states of Virginia, South Dakota, and 
Arizona succinctly: 
Given the broad disclosure required by the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
an ex parte hearing on the defendant's request for assistance would be potentially 
helpful to the indigent defendant only when the expert's analysis turns out to 
support a position contrary to that of the defendant. When we balance the 
potential benefit in some few cases against the harm inherent in ex parte 
proceedings, we cannot conclude such a proceeding is constitutionally required. It 
is not one of the "basic tools" of an adequate defense. We therefore hold that the 
trial court did not en- by refusing to hold an ex parte hearing on defendant's need 
for expert assistance. 
State's Brief at 22, quotingApelt, 861 P.2d at 650 (footnote omitted). It is hard to put into words 
how chilling that sentence reads to defense counsel. The entire purpose of the request for 
assistance is not to say "here are all the reasons my client is innocent" but rather "here are 
reasons that he may be innocent." Some of those reasons may be unknown to the state, and those 
reasons may in due time prove to inculpate the defendant. May this state allow the rich to have 
zealous representation that with the diligence due them fen-ets out possible defense theories 
based on the facts that their investigators discover, while the poor may not even request 
assistance for a mere hope of having the same defense without providing facts and theories to the 
state? 
The state of Arizona and the Attorney General of Idaho each place the cart before the 
horse. Trial counsel does not operate in this way. Cause and effect does not operate in this way. 
Public defenders do not seek assistance for things they know, but things they do not know. And 
public defenders owe it to their clients that they never reveal facts that lead to unknown 




The state argues in its response that this Court should not overrule State v. Besaw, 155 
Idaho 134 (Ct.App.2013). The state also contends that nothing has changed since 2011 when the 
record in Besaw was created that should cause this Court to find that, in point of fact, the ISP's 
SOPs cannot be reliable. 
The state, interestingly, recognizes that for the Court of Appeals to overrule Besaw, it 
must find it was manifestly wrong or that its holding over time has proven unwise or unjust. 
First, the Court of Appeals in Besaw overruled State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36 (Ct.App.1988), by 
changing the requirement for a method from "highly reliable" to "capable of providing an 
accurate result." The Court employed no test when it overruled its prior case. Second, 
circumstances have changed. The fifteen minute waiting period, one of the widest acknowledged 
requirements for accurate breath testing, stopped being a requirement in January, 2013. Standard 
Operating Procedure Breath Alcohol Testing (January 16, 2013). If this Court needs proof that 
Besaw 's holding was unwise, it need only review the behavior of the ISP from 2008 to today. 
Lastly, the Comi's ruling was manifestly wrong. The Court failed to recognize as it did when it 
decided Bell, that the method is only reliable where it is, in fact, a method. The Wheeler dissent 
did not rely on that to come to its holding any more than the majority rejected it when it arrived 
at its holding. Wheeler v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 148 Idaho 378,223 P.3d 761 (Ct. App. 2010), 
review denied. Wheeler was a case involving statutory construction being applied to the SOPs. 
Period. Nothing about the majority opinion held that a method could exist where there were no 
mandatory procedures. The Court of Appeals has never gone that far. The reason Besaw is so 
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wrong is that it can see what the ISP had begun doing at the time that case was at the trial level, 
but rather than realize that under these circumstances there was no way to trust anything the ISP 
was promulgating, it approved of the agency's behavior. The defendant is not interested in 
walrus tears. See State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 88 (Ct.App.2007) quoting Darden v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986). Fundamental fairness and Due Process demand more. 
B. Idaho Administrative Procedures Act 
The state begins its argument by claiming that agencies only need to promulgate rules 
where specifically authorized by statute. State's Brief at 34 quoting I.C. § 67-5231 (I). That is a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act. Rather: 
The regulations that have the "force and effect of law" did not come through 
legislative enactment directly, but were adopted by administrators by authority of 
the legislature embodied in a statute. 
Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660, 668 (I 990). The same misunderstanding of government power 
was posited by the executive in the Asarco matter: 
As a preliminary matter, contrary to DEQ's arguments, an agency action is not a 
rule because it was promulgated according to rulemaking authority and has the 
force and effect of law. Rather, an agency action characterized as a rule must be 
promulgated according to statutory directives for rulemaking in order to have the 
force and effect oflaw. See LC. § 67-5231 (declaring rules void unless adopted in 
substantial compliance with the requirements of the IAP A); Mead v. Arnell, 117 
Idaho 660,664, 791 P.2d 410,414 (1989) (holding rules promulgated by agency 
action have the force and effect of law). See also Minidoka Memorial Hospital v. 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 108 Idaho 344, 699 P.2d 1358 (1985) 
(holding state policy, implemented as a rule without being promulgated as a rule, 
was unenforceable) and Bingham Memorial Hospital v. Idaho Department of 
Health and Welfare, 108 Idaho 346,699 P.2d 1360 (1985) (same). Furthermore, 
even ifDEQ has the discretion under the Clean Water Act to determine whether 
or not the TMDL will have the force and effect of law in Idaho, under Idaho 
administrative law, the TMDL is still a rule and must be promulgated in 
accordance with the IAPA in order to be valid. 
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Asarco, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 723 (2003). Thus, it is not that the executive can do 
whatever it wants except when authorized by statute, but that it has no power, whatsoever, to 
create rules that can have the force and effect of law except when granted that power by the 
legislature. Considering what an incredible misunderstanding of IDAP A this is, defense counsel 
is less surprised by the history of irresponsible and illegal acts on the paii of the ISP. Evidently, 
the executive was under the impression that it could choose to make rules or not, except where 
explicitly told it was authorized to do so. See State's Brief at 35. 
The Attorney General would clearly benefit from a thorough reading of Mead, so as to 
remind itself that: 
Article 2, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution provides for the separation of powers 
among the three branches ofldaho's government. Article 3, § 1 provides that the 
power to pass bills is vested in the legislature. Article 3, § 15 provides that, "[ n ]o 
law shall be passed except by bill, ... " Read together, these three constitutional 
provisions stand for the proposition that, of Idaho's three branches of government, 
only the legislature has the power to make "law." See State v. Nelson, 36 Idaho 
713,213 P. 358 (1923); State v. Purcell, 39 Idaho 642,228 P. 796 (1924); 
Suppiger v. Enking, 60 Idaho 292, 91 P.2d 362 (1939); Board of County Com'rs of 
Twin Falls County v. Idaho Health Fae. Auth., 96 Idaho 498, 531 P.2d 588 
(1975). 
While the power to make law lies exclusively within the province of the 
legislature, (Idaho Constitution, art. 3 § § 1, 15) "the legislature may 
constitutionally leave to administrative agencies the selection of the means and the 
time and place of the execution of the legislative purpose, and to that end may 
prescribe suitable rules and regulations." State v. Taylor, 58 Idaho 656, 664, 78 
P.2d 125, 128 (1938). Administrative agencies do this by enacting rules and 
regulations. See Idaho Code tit. 67, ch. 52. However, while these rules and 
regulations may be given the "force and effect of law," they do not rise to the level 
of statutory law. Only the legislature can make law. Idaho Power v. Blomquist, 26 
Idaho 222, 141 P. 1083 (1914); State v. Nelson, 36 Idaho 713,213 P. 358 (1923); 
overruled on other grounds, Greater Boise Aud. v. Royal Inn of Boise, 106 Idaho 
884,684 P.2d 286 (1984); State v. Purcell, 39 Idaho 642,228 P. 796 (1924); 
Marshall v. Department of Agric., 44 Idaho 440,258 P. 171 (1927); Chambers v. 
McCollum, 47 Idaho 74, 272 P. 707 (1928); State v. Heitz, 72 Idaho l 07, 238 P.2d 
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439 (1951 ); Idaho Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Roden, 82 Idaho 128, 350 P.2d 225 
(1960); Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 94 Idaho 876,499 P.2d 
575 (1972); Board of County Com'rs ofT111in Falls County v. Idaho Health Fae. 
Auth., 96 Idaho 498, 531 P.2d 588 (1975); and Kerner v. Johnson, 99 Idaho 433, 
583 P.2d 360 (1978). 
,Mead, 117 Idaho at 664. Once one recognizes that the executive has no power to make law, that 
ID APA must be followed if an agency wishes to create rules that affect the rights of others, and 
that the foundation for the admission of evidence at the defendant's criminal trial affects the 
defendant's right to Due Process, then it becomes clear that the ISP must follow IDAP A when 
promulgating the procedure that will be the sole foundation for evidence in a criminal trial. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals' precedent is not to the contrary. The Court held in Bell that 
the legislature had created a short form to introduce evidence by passing LC. § 18-8004. The 
Court found in State v. Van Sickle, 120 Idaho 99 (Ct.App.1991) that I.R.E. 901 (b)(l 0) allows the 
legislature to determine a condition whereby evidence is authenticated, in that case, the reliability 
of an Intoxilyzer 3000 breath testing machine. In both of those cases, the Court was reviewing 
the administrative rules promulgated by the Idaho Department Health and Welfare. In Stare v. 
Mills, 128 Idaho 426 (Ct.App.1996), the Court for the first and only time encountered the issue 
of whether "policy statements" could affect rights, but did not reach the issue because it was not 
preserved below. In State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 410-11 (Ct.App.1999), the Court rejected 
the argument that I.C. § 18-8004 violated the separation of powers and I.R.E. 1102. The Court in 
Nickerson with little explanation held that LC. § 18-8004 "specifies one means by which the 
necessary foundation may be established ... " Id. at 411. That is of course not true, as the state so 
points out. State's Brief at 35. The state does not believe that even IDAPA can affect I.C. § 18-
8004. It is hard to understand how the Nickerson Court came to the conclusion that LC. § 18-
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8004 was not the sole foundation that could be laid so long as the executive promulgated rules. 
It is also unclear what the Court was relying on for the principle that, simply because the Comi 
had addressed procedures adopted by the Department of Health and Welfare ten year prior, there 
was no conflict with I.R.E. 1102 when a law purported to determine the proper foundation for 
evidence and waive the requirement for expe1i testimony. Moreover, the Court simply ignored 
the fact that the legislature had given those powers to the executive, and so essentially the wolf 
had been placed in charge of the hen house. 
None of these cases, however, actually held that LC. § 18-8004( 4) allowed the executive 
to come up with whatever rules it pleased. In other states, the procedures for breath testing are 
set by statute. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 5-395.02; C.G.S.A. 14-227a; 10 G.C.A. § 69202. Even Idaho 
requires a fifteen minute wait period between breath samples for the Employer Alcohol and 
Drug-Free Workplace Act. See I.C. § 72-1704. The Idaho Court of Appeals has ruled, despite 
I.R.E. 1102, that the legislature may set the procedure in Idaho for the foundational procedure for 
the introduction of breath samples in criminal trials. The Court of Appeals has tacitly allowed 
that task to be delegated to the executive. But the Court has never held that LC. § 18-8004( 4) 
was a blank check to admit evidence in criminal cases. It has never held that the ISP did not 
have to comply with IDAPA before creating rules that would have the force and effect of law. 
And this Court must not do so now. 
To do otherwise would undo our legal system. There is nothing about DUI cases so 
unique that the concept that the legislature may simply give the executive carte blanche to 
determine what foundation is required for evidence will not spread to every type of case 
imaginable. If this Court does not believe it surrendered power to the legislature in Nickerson, it 
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should review with a critical eye the legislature's wholesale provision of this branch's power to 
the executive. Unless we are to be ruled by tyrants, the flow of powers from the judiciary to the 
executive must stop. 
The state also argues for several pages that if the SOPs are rules then the defendant 
cannot challenge them. That is true, in a sense. But by "challenge," that does not mean that they 
cannot be "challenged" as to their validity for being the foundation of evidence in this case. 
Rather, the Court of Appeal's oft repeated holding that the defense can always rebut the 
presumption that the procedures adopted by the executive are adequate would be untrue in the 
context of a criminal case. Rather, challenging the procedures' accuracy would necessarily have 
to be done through the channels etched out by IDAPA. See Kay Manweiler, Somewhere Over the 
Rainbow and Through the Looking Glass: Administrative Law Practice and Procedure, Advocate 
(Feb. 2002). The state's profound misunderstanding ofIDAPA is likely what leads to its 
confusion expressed in footnote seven on the thirty-ninth page of its brief. The Asarco, Inc. v. 
State, 138 Idaho 719 (2003) ruling is not confusing when one realizes that if an agency has a 
"policy" that it is treating, and forcing others to treat, as a rule with the force and effect of law, 
then it is well within the rights of any citizen and this Court to point out to said agency that its 
"policy" has no such power, and is, in point of fact, null and void. 
The state ends with an illogical argument that the SOPs are simply internal guidelines 
"that, if followed by law enforcement, permit a BAC test result to be introduced in a criminal 
proceeding with the necessity of expert testimony pursuant to LC. § 18-8004( 4)." State's brief at 
43. Assuming the state did not mean this to be ironic, the defense would point this Court to State 
v. Jones, 154 Idaho 412, 417 (2013). It is hardly a fair trial or tribunal where the accuser is also 
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the judge determining \Vhether the evidence comes in. 
IV. 
In its response, the state does not cover any new ground in terms of implied consent. The 
state simply ignores the case law, blithely citing to State v. l1lickerson, 132 Idaho 406 
(Ct.App.1999), the case that improperly interpreted the well-reasoned State v. vVoo!ery. 116 
Idaho 368 (1989) opinion. The state, which below had argued ,Hissouri v. AfcXeely. 133 S.Ct. 
1552 (U.S.Mo. 2013) had no effect on consent now seems to have accepted that perhaps consent 
is rnocable. Hovv exactly it can be that the state may threaten with fines and loss of a license the 
constitutional right to revoke consent is evidently a question for this Court The state claims that 
it can threaten us at our doorsteps to force their way into our house so long as the legislature 
gives them a la'N that provides ·'civil penalties." The defense has provided authority already that 
this argument, besides being ludicrous on its face. is simply untrue. The defense has nothing 
more to add. Either the Fourth Amendment applies or it does not. The state has no right to 
threaten its citizens into giving up federal rights with state laws. 
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